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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a polar coding scheme
for secure communication over the multiple-input, single-output,
single-antenna eavesdropper (MISOSE) fading channel. We con-
sider the case of block fading channels with known eavesdropper
channel state information (CSI) and the case of fading chan-
nels with known eavesdropper channel distribution information
(CDI). We use the artificial noise assisted secure precoding
method to maximize the secrecy capacity in the first case, and
to overcome the unawareness of the eavesdropper CSI in the
second case. We show that our proposed scheme can provide both
reliable and secure communication over the MISOSE channel
with low encoding and decoding complexity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Providing physical-layer security in wireless communica-
tions has drawn much attention. Wyner proved in [1] that both
reliable and secure communication is possible through random
coding, with the constraint that the eavesdropper channel is
degraded with respect to the legitimate channel. Since then, a
lot of work has been done on showing the existence of secure
coding schemes for different kinds of channels. However, few
of these results provide guidance for designing a specific
polynomial-time coding scheme. Only for some special cases
constructive solutions are proposed [2], [3], [4], [5].
Polar codes [6], proposed by Arikan, have shown capacity-
achieving property in both source coding and channel coding
[7]. The structure of polar codes makes them suitable for
designing wiretap codes. Polar codes for wiretap channels
have been studied in [8], [9], [10] and [11], and for relay-
eavesdropper channels in [12]. It has been shown that polar
codes achieve the secrecy capacity of the two-user, memory-
less, symmetric and degraded wiretap channel. The secrecy
capacity defines the maximum achievable rate of which there
exists coding schemes that can guarantee both reliability and
security in communications. To ensure a positive secrecy
capacity, the eavesdropper channel must be degraded with
respect to the legitimate channel. However, this condition may
not be satisfied in practical environments. One intuition of
solving this problem is to jam the eavesdropper channel while
not affecting the legitimate channel. The multiple-antenna
system makes this possible by injecting carefully designed
artificial noise into the transmitting signal on purpose [13],
which is referred to as the artificial noise assisted secure
precoding method.
To the best of our knowledge, polar coding for secure
transmissions in multiple-antenna systems has not been ex-
plored yet. In this paper, we consider the polar coding scheme
for multiple-input, single-output, single-antenna eavesdropper
(MISOSE) fading channels with binary inputs under two
scenarios, the first is that the transmitter knows perfect and
instantaneous channel state information (CSI) of both the
desired receiver and the eavesdropper, which we refer to as the
CSI case, and the second is that the transmitter knows perfect
and instantaneous CSI of the legitimate channel, but only the
channel distribution information (CDI) of the eavesdropper
channel, which we refer to as the CDI case. We combine polar
coding and the artificial noise assisted precoding together, us-
ing the artificial noise to maximize the secrecy capacity in the
CSI case and to overcome the unawareness of the eavesdropper
CSI in the CDI case. We analyse the secrecy capacity of
the MISOSE channel with binary-input constraint after adding
artificial noise, and find the optimal power allocation scheme
between the information-bearing signal and the artificial noise
to maximize the secrecy capacity. For the CSI case our polar
coding scheme achieves the secrecy capacity, and for the CDI
case we propose a scheme that guarantees a given secrecy rate
is achievable with a given probability.
The following notations will be used throughout this paper.
Matrices and vectors are represented by bold upper case
and bold lower case letters respectively. For a vector b, bji
denotes the subvector (bi, ..., bj) of b and bB denotes the
subvector (bi : i ∈ B) of b, where B ⊂ {1, ..., N} and N
is the length of b. F⊗n denotes the nth Kronecker power
of F. W (y|x) is the transition probability of a channel W .
Z ,
∑
y∈Y
√
W (y|0)W (y|1) is the Bhattacharyya parameter
for the channel W . The operator⊕ denotes the binary addition.
II. PRELIMINARIES ON POLAR CODING
Polar codes [6] are the first kind of codes that can achieve
the capacity of a large class of channels with low encoding
and decoding complexities. Polar codes are constructed based
on a phenomenon called channel polarization.
Let G = BNF⊗n, where N = 2n is the code length, BN is
a permutation matrix known as bit-reversal and F =
[
1 0
1 1
]
is called the kernel matrix of a polar code. Consider N inde-
pendent uses of a binary- input discrete memoryless channel
(B-DMC) W as N coordinate bit-channels. By applying the
linear transformation G on these bit-channels we can get a
new N -dimensional channel WN (yN1 |uN1 ), and Arikan has
proved that by observing the channels defined by the transition
probabilities
W
(i)
N (y,u
i−1
1 |ui) =
∑
uNi+1
1
2N−1
WN (y|x), (1)
these synthesized channels polarize in a way that, as N goes
large, W (i)N tends to either a noiseless channel or a purely
noisy channel. The idea of polar coding is to use those
good polarized channels to transmit useful information (called
information bits) and those bad ones to transmit some fix
information (called frozen bits) known by both the transmitter
and receiver in advance.
Denote A as a subset of {1, ..., N} such that ∀i ∈ A, W (i)N
is one of the noiseless polarized channels. Then the encoding
procedure is given by
xN1 = uAGA ⊕ uACGAC . (2)
If we set all frozen bits to be 0, then (2) reduces to
xN1 = uAGA. (3)
The decoding algorithm of polar codes proposed by Arikan
is successive cancellation (SC) decoding, defined by
uˆi =
{
ui, i ∈ AC
hi(y
N
i , uˆ
i−1
i ), i ∈ A
, (4)
where hi is the decision function defined as
hi(y
N
i , uˆ
i−1
i ) =

0
W
(i)
N
(y,ui−11 |ui=0)
W
(i)
N
(y,ui−11 |ui=1)
≥ 1
1 otherwise
. (5)
Arikan has proved in [6] that the block error probability
of a polar code under the SC decoding is upper bounded by∑
i∈A Z(W
(i)
N ), where Z(W
(i)
N ) is the Bhattacharyya param-
eter for W (i)N . In [14] it is shown that for any 0 < β < 1/2,
lim
N→∞
1
N
|{i ∈ [N ] : Z(W (i)N ) <
1
N
2−N
β}| = I(W ), (6)
where I(W ) is the symmetric capacity of W . For a given
β ∈ (0, 1/2) and ǫ > 0, we can define the set of information
indices as A = {i ∈ [N ] : Z(W (i)N ) ≤ 1N 2−N
β}. Then for
sufficiently large N , the rate of
R =
A
N
≥ I(W )− ǫ (7)
is achievable with block error probability upper bounded by
Pe ≤ 2−Nβ . (8)
The key property of polar codes that makes them suitable
for secure communication can be concluded into the following
lemma [7], which will be used in our code design:
Lemma 2.1: Let W1 and W2 be two B-DMCs such that W2
is degraded with respect to W1. Denote the set of information
indices of Wi(i = 1, 2) after channel polarization by Ai. Then
A1 ⊇ A2.
Fig. 1. The MISOSE channel model.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Channel Model
Fig. 1 shows our system model. We consider the secure
transmission in a MISOSE fading wiretap channel with a
binary input alphabet. In this system, a transmitter (Alice),
who is equipped with NA antennas (NA > 1), tries to commu-
nicate with a receiver (Bob) without leaking any confidential
information to an eavesdropper (Eve). Bob and Eve each has a
single antenna. The channel vectors of the legitimate channel
and the eavesdropper channel are denoted by hT and gT
respectively.
The goal of designing secure coding schemes is to make
communication both reliable and secure. To measure the
degree of reliability and security we have the following metrics
[1]:
The reliability condition:
lim
N→∞
Pr{Uˆ 6= U} = 0, (9)
And the security condition:
lim
N→∞
I(U;Z)/N = 0, (10)
where N is the code length, U is the uncoded message, Uˆ is
Bob’s decoding of U, Z is Eve’s observation of X.
B. Artificial Noise Assisted Signal Model
As we know, a positive secrecy capacity can only be
obtained if the legitimate channel has a better condition than
the eavesdropper channel. In our system model, this means
that the legitimate channel’s signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) must
be higher than the eavesdropper channel’s. This condition can
not always be guaranteed in practical scenarios. To solve this
issue, the artificial noise (AN) scheme was proposed [13]. It
is a jamming technique aimed at degrading the eavesdropper
channel while not affecting the legitimate channel.
The artificial noise assisted secure precoding method [13],
proposed by Goel and Negi, is a promising technique for
secure communication over MIMO wiretap channels. The idea
is to inject artificial noise into the null space of the legitimate
channel so that only the eavesdroppers will be interfered. Let
hT = UλVH be the singular value decomposition (SVD) of
hT and let V = [p,Z], where p is the first column of V. Then
p is the orthonormal basis of h, and Z is an orthonormal basis
of hT ’s null space. In the AN-aided scheme, the transmitted
signal x is the sum of information-bearing signal pu and
artificial noise signal Zv,
x = pu+ Zv = V
[
u
v
]
, (11)
where u ∈ {−√Pu,+
√
Pu} is the secret information bit, Pu
is the power per information bit, and v is an artificial noise
vector whose elements vi (i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , NA − 1}) are i.i.d.
Gaussian r.v.’s vi ∼ NR(0, σ2v). Let Pv = σ2v be the average
power of an element in the artificial noise vector v. Suppose
the maximum transmitting power is Pt, then Pu and Pv satisfy
the power constraint of
Pu + (NA − 1)Pv ≤ Pt. (12)
Since Z ∈ RNA×(NA−1) is an orthonormal basis of hT ’s
null space, we have hTZ = 0. The signals received by Bob
and Eve are then given by
y = hTx+ nB = h
Tpu+ nB, (13)
z = gTx+ nE = h
Tpu+ gTZv + nE . (14)
where nB and nE are additive white Gaussian noises (AWGN)
of the legitimate channel and the eavesdropper channel respec-
tively, nB ∼ NR(0, σ2B) and nE ∼ NR(0, σ2E). Since ‖gTZ‖
is not necessarily 0 (unless Z happens to be an orthogonal
basis of gT ’s null space), Eve’s channel is degraded by the
artificial noise with high probability while Bob’s channel
remains unaffected.
The SNR of the legitimate channel is given by:
SNRB =
Pu‖hTp‖2
σ2B
. (15)
The SNR of the eavesdropper channel:
SNRE =
Pu‖gTp‖2
gTZE[vvT ]ZTg + 2E[gTZvnE ] + σ2E
. (16)
Since the entries of the artificial noise vector v are i.i.d.
Gaussian r.v.s, we have E[vvT ] = σ2vI(N−1)×(N−1) and
E[gTZvnE ] = 0. Thus
SNRE =
Pu‖gTp‖2
Pv‖gTZ‖2 + σ2E
. (17)
It is clear from (15) and (17) that by adjusting the
information-bearing signal power Pu and the artificial noise
power Pv, we can make the eavesdropper channel worse than
the legitimate channel, given that g is known to the transmitter
and ‖gTZ‖2 > 0.
IV. SECRECY CAPACITY ANALYSIS
The purpose of adding AN into the channel is to jam the
eavesdropper so that the capacity of the eavesdropper channel
decreases and the secrecy capacity increases. The definition of
instantaneous secrecy capacity is [15]:
CS , max
p(u)
{I(u; y)− I(u; z)}. (18)
In our model the input u is restricted to a binary alphabet
X with uniform distribution, i.e., p(u = −√Pu) = p(u =
+
√
Pu) = 1/2. Thus the instantaneous secrecy capacity can
be rewritten as
CS , I(u; y)− I(u; z) = CB − CE , (19)
where CB and CE are the binary-input constraint channel ca-
pacities of the legitimate channel and the eavesdropper channel
respectively. The mutual information I(x; y) is defined as
I(x; y) =
∑
x
∫ +∞
−∞
p(y|x)p(x) log2
p(y|x)
p(y)
dy. (20)
We assume the CSI of the legitimate channel is perfectly
available at all nodes. Then the instantaneous capacity of the
legitimate channel is
CB =
1
2
∑
u
∫ +∞
−∞
1√
2πσB
exp
(
− (y − h
Tpu)2
2σ2B
)
× log2
exp (− (y−hTpu)2
2σ2
B
)
1
2 exp (− (y−h
Tpu)2
2σ2
B
) + 12 exp (− (y+h
Tpu)2
2σ2
B
)
dy
= 1− 1√
2πσB
∫ +∞
−∞
exp
(
− (y − h
Tp
√
Pu)
2
2σ2B
)
× log2
(
1 + exp (−2h
Tp
√
Puy
σ2B
)
)
dy.
(21)
In [16] the authors give a series expression for evaluating
(21), which is given by
CB = 1− 1
ln 2
[2βBe−β2B/2√
2π
− (2β2B − 1)Q(βB)
+
∞∑
i=1
(−1)i−1
i(i + 1)
e2i(i+1)β
2
BQ[(2i+ 1)βB]
]
,
(22)
where βB = hTp
√
Pu/σB =
√
SNRB and Q(x) =∫∞
x
1√
2pi
e−t
2/2dz. When evaluating the channel capacity using
(22), the maximum of i does not need to be very large since
e2i(i+1)β
2
BQ[(2i+1)βB] vanishes fast with the increasing of i.
For example, when βB = 3, the results when max{i} = 3, 4, 5
does not make much difference.
The instantaneous channel capacity of the eavesdropper
channel without adding artificial noise can be given in
the same expression as (22), with βB replaced by βE =
gTp
√
Pu/σE . After adding artificial noise, since the elements
of the artificial noise vector v are independent Gaussian r.v.’s,
the total noise term in (14) gTZv+nE is also a Gaussian r.v.
with zero mean and variance σ2
E¯
= ‖gTZ‖2Pv + σ2E . If the
eavesdropper channel’s CSI is known by the transmitter, the
channel capacity can be similarly given by
CE = 1−
∫ +∞
−∞
1√
2πσE¯
exp
(
− (z − g
Tp
√
Pu)
2
2σ2
E¯
)
× log2
(
1 + exp (−2g
Tp
√
Puz
σ2
E¯
)
)
dz
= 1− 1
ln 2
[2βE¯e−β2E¯/2√
2π
− (2β2E¯ − 1)Q(βE¯)
+
∞∑
i=1
(−1)i−1
i(i+ 1)
e2i(i+1)β
2
E¯Q[(2i+ 1)βE¯]
]
,
(23)
where βE¯ = gTp
√
Pu/σE¯ =
√
SNRE.
The instantaneous secrecy capacity can then be obtained by
applying (22) and (23) to (19):
CS = CB − CE
= F(βE¯)− F(βB),
(24)
where
F(x) =
1
ln 2
[2xe−x2/2√
2π
− (2x2 − 1)Q(x)
+
∞∑
i=1
(−1)i−1
i(i+ 1)
e2i(i+1)x
2
Q[(2i+ 1)x]
]
.
(25)
To maximize the secrecy capacity, we need to find the
optimal power allocation scheme between the information-
bearing signal and the artificial noise. It is obvious that the
equation in (12) holds when the maximum secrecy capacity
is obtained, otherwise just by simply allocating the redundant
power to the artificial noise will make the secrecy capacity
larger. The optimization problem can be formulated as
max Cs = F(βE¯)− F(βB) (26)
s.t. Pu + (NA − 1)Pv = Pt (27)
Pu > 0 (28)
Pv ≥ 0 (29)
This optimization problem can be turned into a single-
variable problem due to the power constraint of (27), and can
be easily solved.
Fig. 2 shows three examples of the secrecy capacity change
with different Pu. The total transmitting power is Pt = 10.
The channel vector pairs (h, g) in three cases are randomly
generated, and σ2B and σ2E in each case are different.
It can be seen that for case 1 and 2, there exists an optimal
Pu that maximizes the secrecy capacity. But for case 3, CB−
CE is always below 0, which indicates a 0 secrecy capacity.
But if we increase the total transmitting power to 20, as is
shown in fig. 3, case 3 will also have an optimal solution with
a positive maximum secrecy capacity.
V. POLAR CODING SCHEME
As can be seen from (13) and (14), in the AN-assisted
precoding scheme, the channel is equivalent to a single-
input single-output wiretap fading channel. The equivalent
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Fig. 2. Secrecy capacity vs. Pu with Pt = 10.
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Fig. 3. Secrecy capacity vs. Pu with Pt = 20.
channel gains of the legitimate channel and the eavesdropper
channel are h′ = hTp and g′ = gTp respectively. Thus, the
design of polar codes for MISOSE fading channels with AN-
assisted precoding is similar to the polar coding design for
fading wiretap channels. The coding procedure is done on the
message bit u.
Moreover, as we have assumed that perfect and instanta-
neous CSI of the legitimate channel is known at all ends,
the legitimate channel is equivalent to a binary-input AWGN
channel. We first discuss the case that the eavesdropper CSI is
known by the transmitter (the CSI case). We show that in this
case our polar coding scheme achieves the secrecy capacity
with binary-input constraint. Then we discuss the case that the
transmitter only has the CDI of the eavesdropper channel (the
CDI case) and propose a feasible scheme that can guarantee
a given secrecy rate is achievable with a given probability.
This is a more practical assumption since the eavesdropper is
passive and gives no feedback to the transmitter. However, due
to the unawareness of the wiretap channel, perfect secrecy can
not be achieved.
A. Code Construction
1) The CSI Case: In this case the legitimate channel
and the eavesdropper channel are equivalent to two different
binary-input AWGN channels. Thus the code design problem
Fig. 4. Order-permuted version of a codeword.
becomes the problem of designing polar codes for binary-input
AWGN wiretap channels. As has been discussed in [10], the
main idea of polar coding for the wiretap channel is to partition
the set information indices of a polar code for the legitimate
channel into two subsets: the secure bits and the insecure bits.
Denote the set of information indices of polar codes for
the legitimate channel by A, and of the eavesdropper channel
by E . The corresponding sets of frozen indices are then AC
and EC respectively. As the CSIs of both channels are known
by the transmitter, the code construction can be determined
using the Monte Carlo approach [6] or a more accurate
method [17]. Before the code design, we first optimize the
power allocation as discussed in the previous section and
determine the maximum secrecy capacity. In this way we can
guarantee that the eavesdropper is degraded with respect to the
legitimate channel even if the original eavesdropper channel
is better. According to lemma 2.1, if the eavesdropper channel
is degraded with respect to the legitimate channel, E ⊆ A and
AC ⊆ EC . Thus an N -bit long codeword can be partitioned
into three subsets:
G , A− E (30)
M , A ∩ E (31)
B , AC (32)
Fig. 4 gives a visualized view of this partition. It is obvious
that G⋃M⋃B = {1, ..., N}. In a codeword, G corresponds
to the bits that are good for Alice but bad for Eve, M
corresponds to those good for both of them, and B corresponds
to those bad for both of them. To ensure security, we fill
those bits in G with confidential information, those in M with
random bits to confuse the eavesdropper, and those in B with
frozen bits. Let |A| = n and |E| = m, then the code rate is
defined as RS = |G|/N = (n−m)/N . From (6) we have
lim
N→∞
RS = lim
N→∞
(|A|/N − |E|/N)
= I(WB)− I(WE)
= CS
(33)
This means the secrecy capacity can be achieved by our
coding scheme.
Due to the capacity-achieving property of polar codes,
the reliability of our coding scheme is immediate. Since the
information bits in our coding scheme are chosen from the
information bits of the polar code for the legitimate channel,
it is obvious from (8) that
Pr{Uˆ 6= U} ≤ Pe ≤ 2−Nβ (34)
where Pe is the block error probability of polar codes with
block length N . Thus our coding scheme satisfies the reliabil-
ity condition in (9).
It has been proved in [10] that polar codes for the binary in-
put symmetric degraded wiretap channel satisfies the security
condition of (10). We will just skip the proof here.
2) The CDI Case: The CSI case is an ideal case that shows
the theoretical limit of this coding scheme. If the transmitter
does not have the instantaneous CSI of the eavesdropper
channel, the security of communication will be more difficult
to guarantee. In [18] the author considered polar coding for
fading channels without CSI at the transmitter, but with the
constraint that the fading channel has only finite channel states,
which is not suitable for our system.
In this paper, we propose a feasible scheme to combat the
unawareness of the eavesdropper CSI using artificial noise.
To be more practical, we further assume that the variance of
the eavesdropper channel noise is also unknown. In this case
we drop the channel noise items in (17), which corresponds to
the worst case for secure communication that the eavesdropper
channel is noiseless. From (17) we have
SNRE =
Pu‖gTp‖2
Pv‖gTZ‖2 . (35)
First, we evaluate the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) Φ(η) of η = ‖gTp‖2‖gTZ‖2 numerically according to the
distribution of g, and find the value η0 such that Φ(η0) = p0
for a given probability p0 close to 1. This indicates that
Pr
{ ‖gTp‖2
‖gTZ‖2 ≤ η0
}
= p0. (36)
Then, we do the power allocating optimization of (26) with
SNRE = Puη0/Pv, and find the optimal Pu = Pu,o and the
maximum secrecy capacity Cs,o. The equation of (36) and the
noiseless assumption guarantee that a target secrecy capacity
of Cs,o can be achieved with probability at least p0.
Finally, we design polar codes in the same way as the CSI
case.
B. Encoding and Decoding
Encoding Procedure:
The encoder first accepts an message sequence s of n−m
bits and a random bit sequence r of m uniformly distributed
binary bits, and generates the encoded sequence u by
uN1 = sGG ⊕ rGM (37)
The frozen bits are set to all zeros.
Decoding Procedure:
The successive cancellation decoding algorithm requires to
calculate the likelihood ratios (LR) of L(i)N (y,ui−11 |ui) =
W
(i)
N (y,u
i−1
1 |ui=0)
W
(i)
N (y,u
i−1
1 |ui=1)
, which are obtained recursively from
L
(1)
1 (yi) = p(yi|0)/p(yi|1) by Eq. (75) and (76) in [6]. In the
case of the equivalent binary-input AWGN channel of (13),
L
(1)
1 (yi) is given by
L
(1)
1 (yi) =
1√
2piσB
e
− (yi+hT p
√
Pu)
2
2σ2
B
1√
2piσB
e
− (yi−hT p
√
Pu)2
2σ2
B
= e
− 2yihT p
√
Pu
σ2
B
(38)
The decoder first tries to recover both s and r together under
the normal SC decoding procedure, then it extracts the secret
message s according to the code construction.
The complexities of polar encoding and decoding are both
O(n log n) [6]. This means our scheme also has low encod-
ing/decoding complexities of O(n log n).
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section we give some simulation results to show the
performance of our coding scheme.
A. The CSI Case
For the CSI case, we assume that both the legitimate channel
and the eavesdropper channel are with Rayleigh distribution
of scale parameter 1. σ2B is normalized to 1 and σ2E is also
set to 1. The maximum total transmitting power is Pt = 3.
We randomly generate 100 channel vector pairs of (h, g),
and for each channel vector pair, we simulate transmitting
1,000 information bits for each code length (from 24 to 213).
Since there are 100 channel vector pairs to be simulated, the
total number of transmitted information bits is 100,000 for
each code length, which is sufficient to show a minimum bit
error rates (BER) of 10−5. Given a channel vector pair, we
first find the optimal information-bearing signal power and
compute the corresponding legitimate channel capacity CB
and eavesdropper channel capacity CE . Then we calculate
the polar code construction for the legitimate channel of rate
RB = CB − δ and the polar code construction for the
eavesdropper channel of rate RE = CE . We choose δ = 0.11
to ensure reliability for the legitimate channel since the code
length we use is not very long. Finally we determine the secure
polar code construction by (30), (31) and (32).
After the simulation, we calculate the average BERs of the
legitimate channel and the eavesdropper channel of different
code lengths. Fig. 5 shows the result. We can see that with
the increasing of the code length, the BER of the legitimate
channel decreases while the BER of the eavesdropper channel
keeps almost invariant at about 0.5. The poor performance for
short codes is due to the insufficiency of channel polarization
since the polarized channels for information bits are compar-
atively less noiseless than channels for random bits.
B. The CDI Case
For the CDI case, we assume the same distributions as
the CSI case for both channels. The noise variances are
σ2B = σ
2
E = 1, and only σ2B is known by the transmitter.
The maximum total transmitting power is Pt = 5. We first
randomly generate 30 hs and design a secure polar code
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Fig. 5. BER performance of the CSI case.
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Fig. 6. The distribution of BER for the CDI case.
for each h with code length 4,096 and target probability
p0 = 0.85. The gap between the code rate for the legitimate
channel and the channel capacity is set to δ = 0.14. For each
h we randomly generate 30 gs and evaluate the BER for each
(h, g) pair by transmitting 1,000 information bits. After the
simulation, we draw the CDF curves of the BERs.
Fig. 6 shows the result. It can be seen that BER samples of
the eavesdropper channel gather around 0.5, ranging from 0.45
to 0.55, and the vast majority of BER samples of the legitimate
channel are 0. The average BER for the legitimate channel is
6.04 × 10−3 and for the eavesdropper channel 5.01 × 10−1.
By increasing the target probability p0 the CDF curve for the
eavesdropper channel will be even steeper, and by increasing
the code length or δ the reliability of the legitimate channel
can be further enhanced.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we propose a secure coding scheme for the
binary-input MISOSE fading channel based on polar codes.
We first consider the case of block fading channel with perfect
and instantaneous CSI and show that our scheme achieves
the secrecy capacity. Then we further consider the case of
fading channel with only CDI of the eavesdropper channel and
propose a feasible method to ensure a given secrecy rate with a
given probability. The artificial noise assisted secure precoding
method is used in our scheme to degrade the eavesdropper
channel. Our proposed scheme can provide both reliable and
secure communication over the MISOSE channel with low
encoding and decoding complexity.
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